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Commentary
Offence Definitions, Conclusive Presumptions, and
SLot Machines
MICHAEL PLAXTON*
Canadian evidence scholars frequently claim that conclusive presumptions are nothing
more than substantive offence definitions. This position reflects a persistent confusion,
not about the function of legal presumptions in the law of evidence, but about the func-
tion of offence definitions beyond the law of evidence. Offence definitions, unlike concLu-
sive presumptions, serve the normative function of defining wrongful conduct for
citizens. This commentary argues that the Language of conclusive presumptions allows
us to distinguish the gravamen of a criminal offence from a means of facilitating proof of
that wrong. It is, to that extent, worth preserving the distinction between conclusive pre-
sumptions and offence definitions.
Les specialistes canadiens de La preuve font fr6quemment vaLoir que des presomptions
irr~fragables ne sont rien de plus que des definitions de fond d'une infraction significative.
Cette position reflte une confusion persistante, non au sujet de [a fonction des presomp-
tions l6gaLes du droit de Ia preuve, mais relatives aux d6finitions de [a fonction d infraction
au-dela du droit de [a preuve. Contrairement aux pr6somptions irr6fragables, Les d6fini-
tions d'infraction favorisent [a fonction normative de [a d6finition de La conduite transgres-
sive pour Les citoyens. Ce commentaire fait valoir que le langage des presomptions
irr6fragables nous permet de distinguer le fondement de l'infraction criminelle dans le but
de contribuer h [a preuve de cette transgression. Dans cette optique, it est valable de main-
tenir [a distinction entre les pr6somptions irrefragables et Les definitions d'infraction.
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SECTION 201(11 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE STATES: "Every one who keeps a
common gaming house ... is guilty of an indictable offence."' Section 198(2), in
turn, provides that "a place that is found to be equipped with a slot machine
shall be conclusively presumed to be a common gaming house." 2 There are few
other examples of "conclusive presumptions" in the Criminal Code.' It is likely
for this reason that Canadian evidence scholars, in the course of discussing con-
clusive presumptions, almost invariably mention section 198(2). They do so
typically to illustrate the point that, strictly speaking, conclusive presumptions
do not exist; that they are actually nothing other than offence definitions. We
will refer to this view of conclusive presumptions as the "orthodox position."1
The orthodox position, at least in its stronger form,' is wrong. It reflects a
persistent confusion, not about the function of legal presumptions in the law of
evidence, but about the function of offence definitions beyond the law of evi-
dence. Offence definitions do more than tell us what the Crown must prove in a
criminal trial. They also serve the normative function of defining wrongful con-
duct for citizens. It is less obvious that conclusive presumptions serve a like func-
tion. This commentary argues that the language of conclusive presumptions
allows us to distinguish the gravamen of a criminal offence-the wrong it is in-
tended to address-from a means of facilitating proof of that wrong. To that
extent, we should not be too quick to decide that conclusive presumptions are
simply elliptical or duplicitous means of (re)defining offences, or that provisions
1. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 201(1).
2. Ibid., s. 198(2).
3. One possible exainple is contained in ibid., s. 421(2). This section applies where the accused
is charged with engaging in an unlawful transaction in public stores, under s. 417(2). It
creates the conclusive presumption that a person "in the service or employment of Her
Majesty or [who] was a dealer in marine stores or in old metals" knew that "public stores"
bore a "distinguishing mark."
4. For the distinction between the strong and weak versions of the orthodox position, see 148-
49, below.
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which purport to create conclusive presumptions should be replaced with sub-
stantive provisions.
This commentary has six parts. Part I briefly explains the strong orthodox
position. We will see that it has important and counterintuitive implications for
the presumption of innocence, and also that some of its main proponents have
manifested discomfort with its implications. To this extent, it is worth assessing
the merits of the strong orthodox view. In doing so, we will need to consider
the respective functions of offence definitions and legal presumptions. This, in
turn, will require us to consider the distinction (first drawn by Meir Dan-Cohen)
between "decision rules" and "conduct rules."' Parts II and III explain that dis-
tinction. We will see that, although the criminal law purports to authoritatively
express the wrongfulness of certain courses of action, only some rules ("conduct
rules") are directed at members of the public. Other rules ("decision rules") are
addressed exclusively to legal decision makers and are designed to guide them in
the exercise of their discretion. Parts IV and V set out to show that, whereas of-
fence definitions are both conduct rules and decision rules, conclusive presump-
tions are only decision rules. It is, therefore, inaccurate to suggest that they are
functionally equivalent. Part VI uses the conclusive presumption contained in
section 198(2) to illustrate this point.
1. THE ORTHODOX VIEW OF CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
According to the orthodox view, conclusive presumptions do not exist. We can
concisely explain why. Suppose that a criminal offence requires the Crown to
prove A. Also suppose that a legal presumption directs the trier of fact to infer
A upon proof of B. If the presumption is rebuttable, it remains open to the ac-
cused to show that the trier of fact should not, in the particular circumstances
of the case at bar, infer A from B. The important question, in other words, is
not whether B is true, but whether A is true. Where the presumption is conclu-
sive, by contrast, it does not matter that the trier of fact should not infer A from
B-the inference must be made no matter what further evidence (if any) the
accused adduces. Upon proof of B, the factual issue is settled. But in that case,
B is effectively nothing less than an alternative element of the offence: the
Crown can either prove A or B. The conclusive presumption is not just a means
5. See Meir Dan-Cohen, "Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law" (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625.
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of facilitating proof: it sets out an alternative definition of the offence. It is not
a rule of evidence, but a substantive offence definition.
Section 198(2) is typically used to illustrate this reasoning. Ostensibly, the
Crown must prove that the accused kept a common gaming house. In reality,
though, the Crown needs only to prove that the accused kept a place found to
be equipped with a slot machine. Once the Crown proves that fact, it does not
matter if the accused can show that, under the particular circumstances of the
case, the trier of fact should not infer that the place was a common gaming
house. So long as the Crown proves one fact or the other, she will discharge her
burden of proof with respect to the actus reus of section 201(1). Thus, on the
reasoning traditionally employed, section 198(2) does not merely facilitate
proof: it creates an alternative offence element, and so amounts to a rule of sub-
stantive law rather than a rule of evidence. The orthodox view that conclusive
presumptions in general, and section 198(2) in particular, are nothing more
than offence definitions has been adopted by Delisle;' Sopinka, Lederman, and
Bryant;7 and Paciocco and Stuesser' and finds support in the work of Thayer,'
Wigmore,"0 Morgan," and McCormick.12
There are two ways in which to understand the orthodox position. In its
weaker version, the orthodox position amounts only to the claim that conclusive
presumptions have the same evidentiary significance as offence definitions; that
both tell the Crown what it must prove in order to discharge its legal burden in
6. Ronald Joseph Delisle, Don Stuart & David M. Tanovich, Evidence. Principles and
Problems, 8th ed. (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 2007).
7. John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman & Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada,
3d ed. by Alan W. Bryant, Sidney N. Lederman & Michelle K. Fuerst (Markham:
LexisNexis, 2009).
8. See David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law ofEvidence, 3d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2002) at 437.
9. See James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1898) c. VIII at 313ff.
10. See John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, rev. ed. by James Harmon
Chadbourn (Boston: Little, Brown, 1981) vol. 9, s. 2492.
11. See Edmund M. Morgan, "Presumptions" (1937) 12 Wash. L. Rev. & St. Bar J. 255 at
255.
12. See Edward W. Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence, 3d ed. (St. Paul: West, 1984) s. 342
at 965. See also I. H. Dennis, The Law ofEvidence, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
2002) at 4 21.
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criminal cases. This is a perfectly sensible and correct claim. It is also exactly the
sort of claim one would expect to see in evidence textbooks and treatises. But
Delisle, Stuart, and Tanovich; Sopinka, Lederman, and Bryant; and Paciocco
and Stuesser do not simply argue that conclusive presumptions have a similar
evidentiary function as offence definitions. They claim that conclusive pre-
sumptions just are, for practical purposes, offence definitions. We might think
of this as the strong version of the orthodox position.
To some extent, the mere fact that so many evidence scholars have taken
the strong orthodox view makes it an interesting object of critique. But, as it
turns out, the strong orthodox position has important implications for the con-
stitutionality of conclusive presumptions-particularly those used to facilitate
proof of the actus reus. There is nothing unusual in the suggestion that a rebut-
table legal presumption, by reversing the onus of proof on an essential element
of an offence, can infringe the presumption of innocence (even if it is ultimately
saved under section 1)." It would, on the other hand, be quite unusual to claim
that the act requirement contained in an offence definition could itself infringe
the presumption of innocence. Though the Supreme Court of Canada has
struck down criminal offences on the basis that they lack appropriate fault re-
quirements," it has been conspicuously reluctant to strike down offences on the
basis that the acts they proscribe are not wrongful" or do not in fact target the
wrong which Parliament intended to address." The courts have generally taken
the view that Parliament has the last word in authoritatively defining what is and
is not "guilty" behaviour, and that the offence definition provides us with the
13. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 11(d), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K,), 1982, c. 11. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1
S.C.R. 103.
14. See R. v. Martineau, 11990] 2 S.C.R. 633; R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987 2 S.C.R. 636. See
Alan N. Young, "Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the Minimum Content
of the Criminal Law" (2008) 40 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 441 at 481-86.
15. See Antony Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law
(Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) c. 9 at 195ff [Duff, Answering for Crime]. See also Eric
Colvin & Tim Quigley, "Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: The 1987-88
Term" (1989) 11 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 165 at 183 (observing that the presumption of
innocence can do little to protect citizens if Parliament can define the elements of offences
however it wants).
16. See Victor Tadros & Stephen Tierney, "The Presumption of Innocence and the Human
Rights Act" (2004) 67 Mod. L. Rev. 402.
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clearest measure of what behaviour Parliament intended to target." Because Par-
liament is thought to have virtually unreviewable discretion to define wrongful
conduct, it is difficult (if not impossible) to successfully argue that an offence
definition infringes the presumption of innocence by purporting to criminalize
conduct that is actually innocent.
If we suppose that offence definitions cannot infringe the presumption of
innocence (at least insofar as they pertain to the actus reus rather than mens
rea requirement), then the strong orthodox position has constitutional impli-
cations. It would, after all, be strange to think that conclusive presumptions
are offence definitions, but that the former can infringe section 11(d) whereas
the latter cannot. Given the deference courts show to parliamentary judg-
ments of "criminal conduct," the strong orthodox position implies that con-
clusive presumptions pertaining to the act requirement cannot infringe the
presumption of innocence." That is a jarring suggestion: if Parliament can
offend section 11(d) by creating a rebuttable presumption, one would expect
it can do so with a conclusive presumption. (Indeed, one would intuit that
conclusive presumptions are more flagrant infringements of section 11(d),
not less.)19
It is, then, worth thinking about the strong orthodox position, for it has
constitutional implications that are not only troubling, but counterintuitive.
We will see that the strong orthodox position is in fact wrong. To see why it
is wrong, we must look more carefully not just at the role played by legal pre-
sumptions, but at the function of offence definitions-particularly those as-
pects of offence definitions dealing with the actus reus.20
Before getting started, however, we should also take a moment to con-
sider a basic tension that lies at the heart of two influential Canadian discus-
sions-those led by Delisle and by Sopinka, Lederman, and Bryant-of
conclusive presumptions. These discussions are interesting because, though
both explicitly and emphatically state that conclusive presumptions are nothing
more than rules of substantive criminal law, they also propose reformulations of
17. See Young, supra note 14 at 499.
18. This was the position taken (unsuccessfully) by the Crown in R. v. Shisler (1990), 53 C.CC.
(3d) 531 at 538-9 (Ont. C.A.) [Shiser).
19. Thus, the Court of Appeal in Shisler, ibid, ultimately found that the conclusive presumption
contained in s. 198(2) was not justified under s. 1.
20. See infra note 53.
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section 198(2) that show a reluctance to equate it to an offence definition.
Consider, first, Delisle's analysis:
Professor Thayer notes that the term "presumption" is legitimately used only when
the matter presumed is left open to further inquiry. It is sometimes said that given
certain facts other facts shall be "conclusively presumed." ... The Criminal Code
provides that "a place that is found to be equipped with a slot machine shall be
conclusively presumed to be a common gaming house." In truth these are not pre-
sumptions apportioning burdens of proof, but rather rules of substantive law; a
"conclusive presumption" is a contradiction in terms. On proof of the basic fact
the so-called "presumed fact" in such a case is actually immaterial; if the prosecu-
tion proves that the place was equipped with a slot machine the substantive law
provides for conviction and whether the place is a common gaming house or not is
immaterial. It would be best then, in our quest to minimize confusion, to discard
the use of the term "conclusive presumption." The above section could simply be
reworded to provide that "a place that is found to be equipped with a slot machine
is a common gaming house."2 1
There is, in this passage,-an interesting sleight of hand. Delisle argues that
conclusive presumptions are not, properly speaking, presumptions at all, be-
cause on proof of the primary fact the presumed fact becomes irrelevant: having
shown that the accused kept premises equipped with a slot machine, it no
longer matters whether those premises amount to a common gaming house.
Parliament would do better, he claims, to devise a section of the Criminal Code
defining places equipped with slot machines as common gaming houses. In a
way, the suggestion is perfectly sensible: if our problem with conclusive pre-
sumptions is that they make the presumed fact functionally irrelevant to crimi-
nal proceedings, then we resolve the problem by restoring the presumed fact to
its central place in the proceedings. Delisle's proposed rewording accomplishes
that-it indicates that the fact that a place is equipped with a slot machine has
significance only insofar as it makes that place a common gaming house.
We can see why Delisle's solution involves sleight of hand if we observe
that, given the nature of his critique of conclusive presumptions, his proposed
reformulation is actually no reformulation at all. Delisle's complaint with sec-
tion 198(2) is that the conclusive presumption it contains effectively makes it
an offence to keep a place equipped with a slot machine-that the presumption
is, like other so-called conclusive presumptions, a "rule of substantive law"
21. Supra note 6 at 116. I have omitted the reference to doli incapax, which raises distinct issues:
see infra note 53.
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rather than an evidentiary or adjectival rule. His proposed "rewording," by con-
trast, does not make it an offence to keep a place equipped with a slot machine;
it merely indicates the evidentiary significance of the fact that one has been
found to keep such a place. If we accept Delisle's understanding of conclusive
presumptions-that they are substantive offences in disguise-then a true re-
wording of section 198(2) would simply state: "It is an offence to keep a place
equipped with a slot machine." He (rightly) does not propose such a reformula-
tion, but his analysis does not give him the resources to explain why.
The tension in Delisle's account can be stated succinctly: Delisle claims
that conclusive presumptions are substantive rather than evidentiary provisions,
while also claiming that conclusive presumptions can be reformulated as evi-
dentiary provisions without changing their essential meaning. His proposed re-
wording of section 198(2) is intuitively attractive because we are used to
thinking about conclusive presumptions as somehow different from substantive
provisions. Delisle therefore trades on the very intuition he wants to challenge.
This confusion in Delisle's analysis has significance for at least two reasons.
First, it suggests a basic reluctance to treat conclusive presumptions as clear sig-
nals of a parliamentary intention to create new criminal offences. We will see
that his reluctance is entirely appropriate, but only because Delisle was wrong to
suggest conclusive presumptions like section 198(2) are substantive provisions in
disguise. Second, and relatedly, Delisle's proposed reformulation suggests that
conclusive presumptions have more in common with provisions purporting to
gloss the meaning of particular terms than with provisions purporting to define
wrongful conduct. In assessing the merits of conclusive presumptions, we
would do better to ask whether they are as effective as those glossing provisions,
than to ask whether they are effective substitutes for substantive offence provi-
sions. To ask the latter question is to rig the argument against conclusive pre-
sumptions at the outset.
The treatment of conclusive presumptions by Sopinka, Lederman, and
Bryant (SLB) is also telling. They note that "[a] conclusive presumption is a
rule of substantive law clothed in the language of presumptions."22 This plainly
echoes Delisle's critique of conclusive presumptions. Their proposed reformula-
tion of section 198(2), though, is quite different from that of Delisle. Referring
to that section, they remark that "Parliament could have achieved the same result
22. Supra note 7 at 142.
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by defining a common betting house as a place equipped with a slot machine.""
This is a jarring proposal. It seems to do just as effectively what Delisle criticizes
section 198(2) for doing: it strips the concept of "common gaming house" of
any practical significance in criminal proceedings brought under section
198(1). Since, on the SLB formulation, a common gaming house just is a place
equipped with a slot machine, a trier of fact only needs to ask itself whether the
place kept by the accused was equipped with a slot machine-it does not need
to ask whether that place was also a common gaming house.24 If section 198(2)
changes the substantive law by creating a new criminal offence, in short, then so
does the SLB rewording." To a degree, that just shows that the reformulation
does what SLB say it will do: namely, change the substantive law in the manner
of a conclusive presumption without using the (in their view, misleading) lan-
guage of presumptions. But SLB do not remark on the peculiarity of the sug-
gestion that Parliament should change the substantive criminal law, not by
expressly creating a new criminal offence or re-drafting the relevant offence
provision itself, but by radically redefining a term in that provision (possibly,
though not necessarily, in an altogether different section of the Criminal Code).
If Parliament wants to criminalize the keeping of places equipped with slot ma-
chines, why not just say so, and avoid any reference to common gaming houses
in the first place?
In a sense, SLB's reformulation better reflects the ostensibly substantive na-
ture of conclusive presumptions than Delisle's attempted rewording. Delisle, of
course, never said Parliament ought to define common gaming houses as places
equipped with.slot machines; rather, he proposed that places equipped with slot
machines should be defined as common gaming houses. The difference is not
trivial. Delisle's reformulation allows a trier of fact to conclude that a place is a
common gaming house even if it is not equipped with a slot machine-it
glosses the meaning of "common gaming house," foreclosing the possibility of a
trier of fact finding both that a place was equipped with a slot machine and that
23. Ibid. at 143.
24. It is, of course, possible that SLB intended to say that a common gaming house is a place
equipped with a slot machine, as well as other places. In that case, their proposal would more
closely resemble Delisle's rewording, and the same criticisms of Delisle would apply to SLB.
25. In fact, it arguably goes further than s. 198(2): it not only creates the new offence of keeping
a place equipped with a slot machine, but also removes the offence of keeping a common
gaming house. For our purposes, we can set that point aside.
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it is nonetheless not a common gaming house, without saying anything about
other circumstances under which the trier of fact could find that a place is a
common gaming house. His reformulation is designed to guide triers of fact as
they try to determine whether a place is a common gaming house; it does not
change the substantive law (as he claims that section 198(2) does) by making
the issue whether a place is equipped with a slot machine.
The proposed reformulation of SLB, by contrast, would appear to require
the trier of fact to find that a place was equipped with a slot machine as a neces-
sary and sufficient precondition to finding that place a common gaming house.
It does not simply guide triers of fact as they attempt to determine whether a
place is a common gaming house; it effectively makes that question irrelevant as
a matter of law. But, as we have seen, SLB also seem reluctant to fully embrace
the idea that conclusive presumptions change the substantive law rather than
the adjectival law. Though, on their reasoning, one could reformulate section
198(2) simply by proposing a new criminal offence of keeping a place equipped
with a slot machine, they instead suggest a provision that redefines a term in
section 198(1). This approach appears just as elliptical a means of altering the
substantive law as the conclusive presumption it is supposed to replace. Like
Delisle; SLB seem to think that it would be wrong (or, at any rate, not ideal) to
translate conclusive presumptions directly into offence definitions, even though
they regard conclusive presumptions as substantive provisions.
II. CRIMINAL OFFENCES AS AUTHORITATIVE
EXPRESSIONS OF WRONGFULNESS
The law tells us many circumstances under which a person may be subjected to
a deprivation. Income tax legislation tells us when a person may be moved into
a higher tax bracket. Civil forfeiture legislation tells us some conditions under
which a person may be deprived of property.26 Section 35 of the Health Protec-
tion and Promotion Act tells us when a person with a "virulent disease" may be
forcibly detained in Ontario.27 Criminal Code provisions likewise set out condi-
tions under which individuals may be deprived of property or liberty. The dep-
rivation attending a criminal conviction, however, is different from deprivations
26. See e.g. Remedies fr Organized Crime and Other UnlawfulActivities Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 28.
27. R.S.O. 1990, c. H-7 [HPPA].
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attending civil commitment, income tax assessments, or civil forfeiture. Income
taxes are designed to generate public revenue, not discourage people from earn-
ing more money. When we detain individuals with virulent diseases under the
HPPA, we do so as a means of managing threats to public health, not to dis-
courage people from acting as they did. When we seize property through civil
forfeiture proceedings, it is ostensibly to secure some public good, not to dis-
courage people from acting as the (former) owners did. To be sure, these legal
mechanisms can be used to discourage misconduct-civil forfeiture targeting
proceeds of crime is used to "deter crime and compensate victims 28 and "sin
taxes" may be levied to discourage smoking, drinking, or other vices. There is,
however, nothing essentially punitive about such deprivations. Property may be
seized as proceeds of crime whether or not it is possessed by someone who acted
wrongfully in obtaining it. 29 We require a smoker to pay sin taxes on her ciga-
rettes even if we believe that she cannot control her addiction. A person de-
tained as a threat to public health may be unable to do anything to make her
condition less virulent and may have been unable to do anything to avoid con-
tracting her illness in the first place."0
When we fine or imprison an offender as part of a criminal sentence, the
deprivation has quite different significance. It necessarily purports to communi-
cate the judgment that the offender has acted wrongly."' We can see this con-
nection between wrongdoing and sentencing in several places in the criminal
law. The Supreme Court has often observed that criminal sentences must re-
flect the moral blameworthiness of the offender.32 The Criminal Code requires
judges to issue sentences that are "proportionate to the gravity of the offence
and the degree of responsibility of the offender."" Such remarks presuppose the
28. See Chatterjee v. Ontario (A.G.), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624 at para. 3.
29. Ibid. at para. 46.
30. This may be an issue in the context of patients with drug-resistant tuberculosis. See e.g. Toronto
(City) Medical Officer ofHealth v. McKay (2007), 286 D.L.R. (4th) 178 (Ont. Ct. J.).
31. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at
39 [Hart, The Concept ofLaw]; Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits ofthe
Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 78-79; and Andrew Ashworth,
"Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?" (2000) 116 Law Q. Rev. 225 at 232.
32. See R. v. CA.M, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at paras. 36, 40.
33. Supra note 1, s. 718.1. See also R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61; R. v. Wust, [2000] 1
S.C.R. 455.
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offending conduct was wrong in the first place and that the sentence should
track the degree of wrongfulness. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held
that a person can be convicted of a criminal offence punishable with a term of
imprisonment only if she has a degree of fault that is appropriate given the
amount of stigma and punishment involved." This surely presumes that the
offender's acts were wrongful. After all, the intention to engage in a particular
course of conduct, or to produce a particular result, surely signals a "blamewor-
thy" state of mind only if the intended course of conduct is wrongful.3 6
We may, of course, disagree about what it is that makes conduct wrongful
and what makes some kinds of conduct more wrongful than others." We can
set those questions aside. For the purposes of this commentary, it is enough
that we agree that criminal punishment is distinct from civil sanctions insofar as
the deprivation attending the former signifies that the offender acted wrongly,
whereas deprivations attending the latter do not. This point is closely tied to
another (I hope uncontroversial) observation: the purpose of the criminal law is
not to distribute deprivations among members of the public-to tell police of-
ficers when they can arrest citizens, prosecutors when (and what) they can
charge, triers of fact when they can convict, and judges what kinds of sentences
they can deliver-but to guide citizens away from conduct proof of which trig-
gers criminal deprivations. To say that an offender was wrong to act as she did
is to say that the conditions for punishing her should never have been satisfied.
This in itself suggests that criminal offences (unlike tax laws) do not purport
34. See R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [20031 3 S.C.R. 571 at paras. 233-35, Arbour J.,
dissenting in Caine [Malmo-Levine]. For a discussion of the communicative function of
sentencing, see Antony Duff, Trials and Punishments (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1986); Punishment, Communication, and Community (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
35. See Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at
para.1; R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 15.
36. See Malmo-Levine, supra note 34 at para. 230, Arbour J., dissenting in Caine.
37. There is, of course, a vast literature on this subject, largely centring on whether conduct
must reach a certain threshold of harmfulness before it is sufficiently wrongful to be
criminalized. See H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London: Oxford University
Press, 1963); Husak, supra note 31; and Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits ofthe Criminal
Law, vols. 1-4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984-1990).
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merely to distribute deprivations, since the implication is that there should be
no occasion for depriving anyone at all."
Criminal offences purport to do more than express one of many equally
valid conceptions of wrongdoing. The expression of wrongfulness encapsulated
in (and by) a criminal offence is in itself taken seriously by at least some mem-
bers of the public, even if the punishment for non-compliance is trivial and
even if the risk of getting caught or (if caught) punished is trivial or non-
existent. In weighing the reasons for and against regarding a course of action as
wrongful, many members of the public" treat the fact that Parliament has said
it is wrongful as dispositive (or, anyway, highly influential)." In this sense, the
criminal law is not simply a system of "orders backed by threats."" For many
citizens, compliance with the criminal law has little or nothing to do with the
threat of punishment (or the likelihood of it being carried out), and much to do
with the judgment that they ought to comply because a criminal prohibition
represents an authoritative expression of wrongfulness.42 (We will set aside the
question of whether, and under what circumstances, it is right for citizens to
think of the criminal law as authoritative in this sense.)
III. CONDUCT RULES AND DECISION RULES
Criminal offences, in summary, purport to authoritatively convey the wrong-
fulness of certain courses of action to citizens. That in itself does not make of-
fence definitions distinct from conclusive presumptions-we might just as
easily say that the criminal law generally serves this guidance function. But not
every aspect of the criminal law does serve that function. We can distinguish
between "conduct rules" and "decision rules."" Conduct rules are directed at
38. See John Kleinig, "Criminally Harming Others" (1986) 5 Crim. Just. Ethics 3; Hart, The
Concept ofLaw, supra note 31 at 38.
39. Even Hart conceded that many members of the public will treat the criminal law as reason-
giving only insofar as it makes threats that are likely to be carried out. See Hart, ibid
40. See Joseph Raz, "The Relevance of Coherence" in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the
Morality ofLaw and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) c. 12 at 261ff
41. Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 31, c. 3 at 26ff.
42. See John Gardner, "Justifications and Reasons" in Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the
Philosophy of Criminal Law (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 91.
43. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 5.
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members of the public for the purpose of guiding their behaviour." Decision
rules direct legal officials as to the circumstances under which they should convict
citizens for criminal offences and punish them in a particular way." Criminal
Code prohibitions of robbery or theft are examples of conduct rules. By con-
trast, provisions requiring an acquittal where an offence (like theft or robbery)
was committed as a result of duress or necessity are decision rules." Likewise, a
statutory or common law rule directing judges to grant an absolute discharge to
people convicted of theft of goods valued less than $5.00 could be described as
a decision rule.
Why believe certain rules of criminal law are not directed at citizens? First
and foremost, we often want members of the public to weigh their reasons for
action in light of some legal rules, but not in light of others. Consider the de-
fence of necessity." We recognize that defence ostensibly because actors cannot
always realistically choose to obey the law-sometimes, it is said, the violation is
the result of "moral involuntariness."" This reflects the intuition that some perils
are so imminent, dire, and unavoidable through lawful means that we refuse to
condemn a person for breaking the law to avoid them. At the same time, we
ordinarily expect members of the public to comply with the law even if doing
so is against their interests (hence the old saw that motive is irrelevant to liabil-
ity)." We expect them to regard the expression of wrongfulness encapsulated in
the criminal offence as authoritative even in the face of what they subjectively
perceive as "peril," so long as moral involuntariness is (objectively speaking) not
50
an issue.
The trouble is that a member of the public, if and when she becomes aware
of the defence of necessity, may be too quick to conclude that a threat to her
44. Ibid. at 626-34.
45. Ibid. We might speak just as well of "guidance rules" and "enforcement rules." See Dale E.
Nance, "Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral" (1997) 83
Va. L. Rev. 837.
46. Dan-Cohen, ibid. at 637-48.
47. Ibid. at 637-39. The account that follows departs from Dan-Cohen's explanation to the
extent that the Canadian approach to necessity is not the same as the American approach.
48. See R. v. Perka, [1984) 2 S.C.R. 232 at 249; R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687.
49. See R. v. Lewis, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 821; Eric Colvin & Sanjeev Anand, Principles ofCriminal
Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 192-93.
50. See R. v. Latimer, 120011 1 S.C.R. 3 at para. 27.
PLAXTON, OFFENCE DEFINITIONS. CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS 159
interests is especially dire, or that its crystallization is imminent, or that her
response is "proportionate" and "unavoidable."5 1 She may be too quick, in other
words, to decide her actions are morally involuntary and commit a criminal
offence without a valid excuse. The person who treats criminal offences as
authoritative expressions of wrongfulness, and has no idea that the defence of
necessity exists, will be far less likely to commit a criminal offence unless
compliance is all but impossible. She will comply unless and until she truly has
no realistic choice-precisely the circumstances in which the defence is
supposed to apply. The defence of necessity should be used by legal officials
when they decide whether to charge and convict some offenders, but it should
not guide the conduct of citizens. Likewise, rules suggesting that some offences
should receive only an absolute or conditional discharge should not influence
citizens when deciding whether to comply with a criminal offence.
Consider also the doctrine of doli incapax. Section 13 of the Criminal Code
states: "No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or omis-
sion on his part while that person was under the age of twelve years."52 Though
the section requires the acquittal of persons who engage in criminal acts before
the age of twelve, it could not mean that children under twelve cannot commit
wrongful acts or that the criminal offences contained in the Criminal Code pur-
port to define wrongful behaviour for everyone except people under the age of
twelve. If a five-year-old picks up a carelessly stored handgun and shoots her
brother, she has surely engaged in wrongful behaviour. She is acquitted, not be-
cause her conduct is not wrongful, but because she is conclusively presumed"
51. Members of the public may not appreciate the normative difference between excuses and
justifications. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 5 at 639-40; Simon Gardner, "Necessity's Newest
Inventions" (1991) 11 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 125 at 127; and "Instrumentalism and
Necessity" (1986) 6 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 431 at 432.
52. Supra note 1, s. 13.
53. Because this is a conclusive presumption going to the accused's lack of mens rea, rather than
one going to the presence of an element of the actus reus, I am reluctant to lump the doctrine
of doli incapax together with s. 198(2) in discussions of conclusive presumptions. To be sure,
both conclusive presumptions are decision rules (for reasons which will become clearer). It is,
however, less obvious that mens rea requirements in offence definitions ever perform a
conduct-guiding function in the manner of actus reus requirements. I am, for that reason, less
confident that conclusive presumptions going to the (non-)existence of mens rea are
conceptually different from substantive mens rea requirements contained in offence
definitions.
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to lack culpability and so is exempt from having to answer for her wrongful acts
in a criminal court. 14 Importantly, we probably do not want children under
twelve to know they enjoy an exemption. We want them to regard criminal of-
fences as authoritative determinations of wrongfulness without being tempted
to "game" the system, and the surest way to tempt emotionally immature peo-
ple into doing so is to inform them they can break the law with impunity.55
Again, the distinction between decision rules and conduct rules allows us to say
that the doctrine of doli incapax should guide exercises of discretion by decision
makers but should not affect the way in which children regard the norms cre-
ated by criminal offences.
One could argue that the distinction between conduct/guidance rules and
decision rules is false; that a person who knows that the defence of necessity
exists, or knows that absolute discharges are issued when one steals less than
$5.00 worth of goods, may use that information to decide whether, when, and
how to commit theft or robbery. She may respond to this information by per-
forming a robbery while pretending that she is under duress or by stealing only
small bags of candy. And, indeed, the law in this situation has served a guidance
function of sorts. It is, however, guidance of the incorrect sort. The person who
games the offence of robbery or theft, by feigning duress or stealing less than
$5.00 worth of goods, has used the criminal law as a basis for predicting the
circumstances under which she will suffer a deprivation." She has not used it,
though, as a means of determining whether robbery and theft are wrongful acts.
If she had used it in that way, it would not matter that she could avoid sanc-
tions through deception or calculation-she would nonetheless reject robbery
and theft as acceptable courses of action. The point is not that only Holmesian
"bad men" commit criminal offences. The point is just that people who, like
Hart's "puzzled man," regard the expressions of wrongfulness embodied in
criminal offences as authoritative (i.e., obligation-generating) will not take the
54. Consider the discussion in Norvin Richards, "Criminal Children" (1997) 16 Law & Phil.
63. For a discussion of exemptions see Duff, Answering for Crime, supra note 15 at 284-91;
Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (New York Oxford University Press, 2005) at 124-29.
55. Indeed, members of the public frequently complain that young offenders reason in exactly
this way; i.e. that, because they do not face similar sanctions as adult offenders, they have less
reason to comply with the criminal law. .
56. In this sense, she is like Holmes' "bad man." See Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the
Law" (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457.
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low risk of punishment as a reason to ignore (or game) those offences. Since the
criminal law aims at that kind of authoritativeness," it follows that certain rules
are not supposed to be considered by members of the public when deciding
how to act. We do not need to make the (silly) claim that no citizen in a legal
order such as ours games the criminal law. Many probably do." We cannot,
however, make sense of what distinguishes the criminal law from orders backed
by threats, or what distinguishes it from quite different fields of law, if we focus
our attention on people who do not treat the expressions of wrongfulness con-
tained in the criminal law as authoritative.
IV. THE DUAL CHARACTER OF OFFENCE DEFINITIONS
So far, we have assumed that rules of criminal law must be either conduct rules
or decision rules. Some rules have a dual function: they communicate to both
citizens and legal officials. Offence definitions are rules of this type. They tell
citizens what they should not do, and they tell legal officials what the Crown
must prove before they can convict a citizen of a criminal offence. Importantly,
they do not necessarily convey the same message to both recipients. Offence
definitions make use of ordinary terms that have technical legal meanings."
Consider just a few examples. A "public place" does not include a person's living
room, even when the curtains are wide open, the lights are on, and all the world
can see what is going on inside."o A person can "use a firearm" simply by
verbally revealing that it is present, even if it is never brandished." A "weapon"
57. Hart himself did not argue that we should privilege the perspective of the "puzzled man"
over that of the bad man-only that a theory of law should be able to accommodate the view
of the puzzled man. See Stephen R. Perry, "Holmes versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal
Theory" in Steven J. Burton, ed., The Path ofthe Law and Its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 158; Scott Shapiro,
"The Bad Man and the Internal Point of View" in Burton, 197. Other theorists have argued
more pointedly that citizens ought to adopt the viewpoint of the puzzled man. See W.
Bradley Wendel, "Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View" (2006) 75 Fordham L.
Rev. 1473.
58. Hart would not have necessarily disagreed with this claim. See Hart, The Concept ofLaw,
supra note 31 at 38-39.
59. See Andrew Halpin, Definition in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).
60. See R. v. Clark, (20051 1 S.C.R. 6.
61. See R. v. Steele, [20071 3 S.C.R. 3.
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can be any object used to cause injury, whether or not it was designed for that
purpose.62 A firearm "is capable" of firing bullets in rapid succession with a
single pull of the trigger so long as it is capable ifadapted.6 ' A person "consents"
to sexual contact if she "want[s]" that contact." None of those understandings
of the terms involved are self-evident or necessarily correspond to everyday usage.
Standing naked in front of one's lit living room window would intuitively strike
many people as a public act. "Using a firearm" will strike many people as very
different from "describing or referring to a firearm." We often think that a
person can want to engage in an act without consenting to it, and can consent
to an act without wanting to engage in it.
Because criminal offences are defined with reference to ordinary terms that
have technical meanings, members of the public may understand an offence to
condemn a relatively broad range of conduct, whereas legal officials understand
it to authorize them to convict on proof of a relatively narrow range of conduct.
This "acoustic separation" may be desirable, inasmuch as we want to accom-
plish different things depending on the group to whom the law addresses itself."
It is worth taking a moment to examine that claim.
Offence definitions are, insofar as they are directed at citizens, supposed to
authoritatively express the wrongfulness of courses of action." The language we
use to convey the wrongfulness of a particular course of action is often "fuzzy"
(particularly since it is morally laden) and open to a range of interpretations.
To draw on earlier examples, reasonable people may disagree about what it
means to engage in sexual contact "without consent," or what it means to "use
a firearm." We may be prepared to accept a (large) degree of ambiguity to the
62. See R. v. Lamy, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 860 at para. 16.
63. See R. v. Hasselwander, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 398.
64. See R. v. Ewanchuk, [1991 1 S.C.R. 330 at para. 61.
65. Dan-Cohen, supra note 5 at 649-50.
66. It has been suggested that because terms may need to be read in or out of offence definitions
to make them constitutionally compatible, they may not function as conduct rules in all
instances. Presumably, the suggestion is that, unless or until constitutionally problematic
terms have been read out of offence definitions (or other terms read in), the offence
definition is unconstitutional, and so citizens should not or do not treat it as authoritative
(or, therefore, conduct-guiding). But this seems to call into question the unaltered offence
definition's status as an offence definition in the first place, given that Parliament lacked the
authority to create it.
67. Dan-Cohen, supra note 5 at 655-56. See also Halpin, supra note 59.
PLAXTON, OFFENCE DEFINITIONS, CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS 163
extent that offence definitions are directed at citizens: supposing that citizens
regard the Criminal Code's expressions of wrongfulness as authoritative, we can
also suppose that they will interpret ambiguous language in the broadest rea-
sonable way possible to avoid straying into wrongful conduct.68 (Those who try
to game ambiguous terms-for example, "torture"-may be said to wander, as
it were, onto thin ice.) 6 1
When addressed to legal officials, offence definitions are supposed to con-
strain exercises of discretion. This requires greater technical precision: fuzzy
moral language, because it lends itself to an array of interpretations, would (if
left vacuous) allow legal decision makers more discretion (in the "hard" sense)70
than the rule of law could stomach. It will ordinarily fall to the courts to give
precise legal content to ambiguous terms-e.g., "public place," "weapon," or
"consent"-and tell us the circumstances (whether wide or narrow) under
which legal decision makers are entitled to find that a given element of an of-
fence has been satisfied. By "filling" ambiguous terms with precise legal con-
tent, we constrain the discretion to charge and convict." Importantly, though,
the public at large would rarely be notified of the judicial glosses put on the of-
fence definitions contained in the Criminal Code in the way that it would be
notified of the creation of the offence itself. The practical upshot is that, while
citizens are expected to act on a broad understanding of the offence definition,
decision makers may be directed to act on a (relatively) narrow understanding.72
We should not assume that, because decision makers work with a narrower
understanding of offence definitions, their understanding is "correct" whereas
68. Dan-Cohen, ibid. at 650.
69. For a discussion of the thin ice principle, see Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law,
5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 73-74. See Jeremy Waldron, "Torture
and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House" (2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681
(criticizing, by implicitly drawing upon the thin ice principle, attorneys seeking to define
"torture" in a narrow way).
70. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978)
c. 2 at 14ff.
71. This is not to say that the "official understanding" of offence terms is necessarily narrower
than the "public understanding."
72. Dan-Cohen, supra note 5 at 651. See also Dale E. Nance, "Rules, Standards, and the
Internal Point of View" (2006) 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1287 at 1300-04 (discussing some
implications of this mismatch between citizen and official understandings of legal rules for
the authority of law).
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the public's broader understanding is "incorrect." The meaning of terms for
decision-making purposes, as we have seen, may be narrowed for no other rea-
son than to limit discretion. Discretion may be constrained not only in the sense
that decision makers can convict only those people who have committed the
wrong that Parliament actually intended to target when it devised the offence in
question; the constraint may go further and entail the acquittal of individuals
who do engage in a targeted wrong. This would, of course, open up the possi-
bility that a citizen could engage in prohibited conduct without facing any risk
of sanction. But this is, in itself, unproblematic. Citizens are expected to regard
parliamentary expressions of wrongfulness as authoritative even without the
threat of punishment. To the extent we think it important to convey the seri-
ousness of the wrong by sanctioning and stigmatizing offenders, we may none-
theless think the presence of gaps in enforcement/punishment less worrisome
than the discretion that decision makers would have if we aimed at "perfect"
enforcement.
The disjunction between public and official understandings of a criminal
offence becomes problematic when the official understanding of the conditions
for conviction is manifestly wider than the public understanding of the wrong
targeted by the offence in question (even among those who would be inclined
to interpret the wrong widely out of deference'to Parliament's wrong-defining
authority). In that case, we are more inclined to say that members of the public
have not been given a fair opportunity to respond appropriately to the expression
of wrongfulness embodied in the offence. This raises clear rule of law concerns.73
There are two reasons for reflecting, however briefly, on the different mes-
sages that offence definitions send to members of the public and to legal deci-
sion makers. First, it establishes that the distinction between conduct rules and
decision rules does conceptual work even when we have, on the surface, a single
set of rules. This is especially important for the purposes of this commentary, as
we consider the distinction between offence definitions and conclusive pre-
sumptions. We will see in Parts V and VI that presumptions (including conclu-
sive presumptions) are exclusively directed at legal decision makers, and do not
purport to guide citizens.
Second, we have a better sense of the reasons for having conclusive pre-
sumptions when we reflect upon the legitimate interests the state has in sending
73. See Lon Fuller, The Morality ofLaw (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
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divergent messages to citizens and to decision makers. We have seen that of-
fence definitions may send divergent messages in an attempt to condemn an
expansive class of conduct while constraining official discretion as far as practi-
cable. This may be especially effective where Parliament creates the offence
definition and the courts gloss the terms contained in it; as noted above, citi-
zens are not notified of judicial interpretations as they are notified-when new
offences are created. But what if Parliament decides to issue its own glosses on
the language contained in its offence definitions, or decides to provide some
other kind of guidance to triers of fact as they decide whether the elements of
an offence have been satisfied? One may not be able to incorporate a direction
designed to constrain discretion into the offence definition itself without nar-
rowing or obscuring the expression of wrongfulness directed at citizens. Sup-
pose, for example, that Parliament drafted section 173(1) so that it prohibited
indecent acts in "public places other than one's own living room." In that
event, members of the public would be entitled to think that it is not only not
sanctionable to engage in indecent acts in their own living rooms, but that it is
not wrongful to do so whether or not others can see them. The direction to of-
ficials would obscure the direction to citizens.
This point is significant when we consider that, as we will see shortly, pre-
sumptions are designed to help triers of fact draw appropriate inferences from
proof that some state of affairs existed. Parliament, though it wants to guide
decision makers in the use they will make of proof of that state of affairs," may
not wish to give members of the public the impression that there is something
uniquely or especially wrongful about that state of affairs in particular. Its inter-
est in maintaining "acoustic separation" may, therefore, give it a good reason to
issue a direction to decision makers from outside the four walls of the offence
definition.
In observing that conclusive presumptions can function as a means of
achieving greater acoustic separation, my intention is not to urge their use-
only to suggest, by way of explaining their existence, that they can serve a pur-
pose (whether or not some other kind of provision could serve that purpose just
as well). Parliament has other means at its disposal for guiding triers of fact in
their understanding of legal terms of art deployed in offence definitions. Indeed,
74. Laurence H. Tribe, "Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions:
Three Linked Riddles" (1975) 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 8 at 10-11 (noting that
conclusive presumptions constrain arbitrary exercises of discretion by decision makers).
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the Criminal Code is rife with provisions purporting to guide exercises of offi-
cial discretion, but which are not framed as conclusive presumptions. Section
150, for example, states that a "'public place' includes any place to which the
public have access as of right or by invitation, express or implied."" This section
puts triers of fact on notice: once one finds that members of the public were
invited to a place, one must regard that place as having been "public" (at least
for so long as the invitation lasted) for the purposes of section 173(1). Consider,
too, Delisle's proposed replacement for section 198(2). This would, remember,
state that a place equipped with a slot machine is a common gaming house (or,
to rephrase, that a "common gaming house" includes any place equipped with a
slot machine). As we noted in Part I, such a provision would guide triers of fact
as they determined what inferences they could choose not to draw, having
found that a place was equipped with a slot machine.
There are many other term-clarifying provisions in the Criminal Code,
some of which do much more to define the terms they purport to clarify than
section 150 and Delisle's hypothetical provision. It is unnecessary, for our pur-
poses, to discuss them in any depth-i.e., to determine whether some or all of
these provisions are more successful than conclusive presumptions at generating
acoustic separation, or whether (if they are less successful) there are other rea-
sons to prefer them over conclusive presumptions. So long as we accept that
conclusive presumptions are decision rules, and that this distinguishes them
from offence definitions, this commentary's primary conceptual argument will
be made out. Let us turn, then, to presumptions.
V. PRESUMPTIONS: DECISION RULES, NOT CONDUCT
RULES
Offence definitions express the wrongfulness of certain courses of conduct to
members of the public. They also set out what the Crown must prove to obtain
a conviction. In proving the elements of a given criminal offence, the Crown
will adduce evidence. If that evidence is admissible and accepted by the trier of
fact, it will logically support the inference that those elements exist. Logic and
experience may tell us that a particular element of an offence can usually be
inferred from proof that some other "basic" (or "primary") fact exists. If the
75. Supra note 1, s. 150.
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inferential connection between the basic fact and the element is sufficiently
reliable, Parliament may decide that it is needlessly inefficient to require triers
of fact to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the element can be inferred
from that fact. It may, instead, direct triers of fact to presume the element in
question from the basic fact.
Presumptions are decision rules. They "speak" to triers of fact, instruct-
ing them to infer Y upon proof of X; that is, they direct decision makers to
discharge their functions in a certain way upon a finding that X is the case."
For example, section 212(1)(j) of the Criminal Code makes it an offence to
live off the avails of prostitution." Section 212(3) directs the trier of fact to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the accused lived off
the avails of prostitution upon proof that she lived with (or was habitually in
the company of) a prostitute." The section tells the trier of fact that, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, a finding that the accused lived with a
prostitute requires it also to find that the Crown has proven the accused lived
off the avails of prostitution.
Presumptions are not conduct rules. They do not authoritatively express
the wrongfulness of courses of action. Consider the above example. A person
who lives with a prostitute does nothing wrong by virtue of that fact alone. The
presumption contained. in section 212(3) directs the trier of fact to infer that
the defendant committed the wrong upon proof that she lived with a prostitute.
If she is convicted as a result of the presumption, though, she is condemned not
for living with a prostitute, but for living off the avails of prostitution. This is a
pivotal distinction. Section 212(1)(j) is directed at a particular kind of wrong:
the wrong of pimping or "living parasitically off a prostitute's earnings."" It ex-
presses.the wrong of a particular kind of exploitation and violence (both sexual
and otherwise). It does not suggest that there is anything wrongful about being
the friend or spouse of a prostitute; that there is anything wrongful about caring
(or being seen to care) about sex workers. To say that a person convicted through
the operation of section 212(3) has been convicted because she lived with a
prostitute, though, is to interpret the wrong in the latter sense. This is not only
76. See Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant, supra note 7 at 144-45.
77. Supra note 1, s. 212(1)(j).
78. Ibid., s. 212(3).
79. See R. v. Downey, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10.
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unfair in the sense that it misrepresents Parliament's expression of wrongfulness.
It is unfair to the victim,8 0 whose exploitation has not been recognized and
whose company has been treated as a reason to stigmatize others.8 ,
Consider a further example. Under section 322 it is a criminal offence to sell
stolen goods, including precious metals. The trier of fact is directed to presume,
upon proof that the accused sold precious metals, that these were stolen unless
the accused adduces evidence to the contrary.82 Let us suppose that the Crown
proves that a defendant sold precious metals and, through the operation of the
presumption, this defendant is convicted. It would, again, badly mischaracterize
the wrong to suggest that the accused was convicted because he sold precious
metals, without describing the goods as "stolen." Section 322 expresses the
wrongfulness of the sale or trade of stolen precious metals. It does not reflect
the view that the sale of precious metals generally is wrongful.
In some sense, presumptions could be construed as conduct rules: a person
who wanted to avoid the sanctions attached to an offence would be well-
advised to avoid engaging in conduct proof of which would trigger a presump-
tion. But the object of the presumption is not to discourage people from engag-
ing in the behaviour it describes any more than the object of tax laws is to
discourage people from earning (more) income. The presumption in section
212(3) is not supposed to discourage people from living with prostitutes. The
presumption in section 656 is not supposed to discourage people from selling
precious metals. A person who acted in those ways would do nothing wrong,
even if we thought it imprudent to do so (at least under circumstances where it
would be difficult to rebut the presumption later). To treat these presumptions
as conduct rules would misconstrue them as surely as we would misconstrue the
defence of duress if we treated it as a conduct rule. In either case, we would
80. For a discussion of fair labelling, see James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, "Fair Labelling in
Criminal Law" (2008) 71 Mod. L. Rev. 217; Andrew Ashworth, "Taking the Consequences"
in Stephen Shute, John Gardner & Jeremy Horder, eds., Action and Value in Criminal Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 107 at 114.
81. It has been suggested that the purpose of s. 212(l)(j) may be to isolate prostitutes and
thereby discourage prostitution without criminalizing it. On that understanding, though, the
section is not criminal but civil-it aims to redistribute the benefits of companionship and
the burdens of prostitution without declaring prostitution wrongful. One could conceivably
argue that s. 212(1)(j) targets the wrong of encouraging people to live as prostitutes, but the
section is too narrowly tailored to sustain such an interpretation.
82. Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 656. See R. v. Laba, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 965.
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have confused a rule designed to direct decision makers with a rule designed to
authoritatively express a wrong."
The same point can be made by considering whether it would be appropri-
ate to explain a person's criminal conviction simply by referring to the basic fact
triggering a rebuttable-but-unrebutted presumption. In a superficial sense it
would: but for that conduct, the trier of fact would not have rendered a guilty
verdict. But we could just as easily say the trier of fact would not have rendered
a guilty verdict but for the poor quality of the accused's legal representation, or
the colour of his tie, or the trier of fact's heartburn. Such accounts give us some
insight into the decision-making process, but they do not explain why we are
punishing the offender rather than merely sanctioning her. That kind of expla-
nation must refer (either implicitly or explicitly) to the fact that the offender
deserves her sanction-i.e., to the fact that she has engaged in a wrongful act
and that she was convicted because she engaged in it. To explain a conviction
with reference to the basic fact alone is to obscure or badly distort the wrong
that justifies punishment in the first place." We do not punish a person merely
because she lives with a prostitute. We do not punish a person merely because
she sells precious metals. If we punish such people at all, we do so because they
committed particular wrongful acts, wrongs inferred from the fact that they
lived with prostitutes or sold precious metals. In short, our explanation of a
conviction cannot focus on the basic fact, disregarding the inference of wrong-
doing it triggers, without stripping the normative significance that makes the
offence criminal.
One might argue that we have missed the mark by dwelling on rebuttable
presumptions. These are, after all, supposed to be wildly different from conclu-
sive presumptions: whereas conclusive presumptions are regarded as function-
ally the same as offence definitions, rebuttable presumptions are not. Consider,
though, why they are ostensibly different. Evidence scholars claiming conclusive
83. One might object that the defence of duress, if treated as a conduct rule, encourages people
not to abide by criminal offences; whereas presumptions, if treated as conduct rules, arguably
encourage at least a form of compliance. Even if true, it makes no difference to the argument
made here. A rule does not become a conduct rule by virtue of its salutary effect on
obedience, but by virtue of its normative significance.
84. To this extent, we should be somewhat wary of the suggestion that presumptions, when cited
as reasons for reaching decisions, actually legitimate them. See Karen Petroski, "The Public
Face of Presumptions" (2008) Episteme 388 at 395-97.
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presumptions are equivalent to offence definitions do so primarily on the basis
that an inference conclusively triggered by proof of a basic fact becomes irrele-
vant; that the basic fact becomes a de facto offence element." Inthe context of
rebuttable presumptions, the inference to be drawn from the basic fact osten-
sibly remains relevant in deciding whether the presumption has been rebut-
ted; that is, whether the inference to be drawn from the basic fact remains
valid in light of other evidence. Since there is no possibility of rebuttal in the
case of conclusive presumptions, as the argument goes, the usefulness of the
inference is exhausted.
The argument is telling. It presupposes the inference drawn from the basic
fact is useful only insofar as it helps decision makers. The argument ignores the
usefulness of the inference as a means of explaining the wrongfulness of the
offender's conduct, i.e., after the verdict has been rendered." We have seen that
it would be absurd to try to explain a conviction without referring to the fact
inferred through the operation of a rebuttable-but-unrebutted presumption,
since doing so would blunt or distort the normative significance of the offence.
We must look to the inferred fact if we are to bring the wrong targeted by the
offence more closely into view. But there is no reason to think the attempt any
less absurd when the presumption is conclusive rather than rebuttable. To see
why, let us return to the offence of keeping a common gaming house.
VI. KEEPING A COMMON GAMING HOUSE
The offence of keeping a common gaming house is one of several offences di-
rected at the keeping of "disorderly houses." These provisions do not suggest
that betting, gaming, or prostitution are wrongful in and of themselves. It
would be strange for a provision targeting gaming, betting, or prostitution to
criminalize the keeping of places where those activities occurred rather than the
activities themselves. Rather, these provisions express the wrongfulness of keep-
ing houses that ostensibly cause a certain kind of harm to the community. As a
majority of the Supreme Court remarked in R. v. Rockert- "[T]he mischief to
which [the disorderly house] offences were directed was not the betting, gaming
and prostitution per se, but rather the harm to the interests of the community in
85. See 147-48, above.
86. For a discussion of the relationship between fair labelling and conclusive presumptions, see
Tribe, supra note 74 at 17.
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which such activities were carried on in a notorious and habitual manner.""
Thus, a majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Labaye held that conduct is
"indecent" for the purposes of section 210(1) only if it produces harm incom-
patible with proper societal functioning.8 8
Likewise, there are strong suggestions in the definition of "common gam-
ing house" that it is not directed at gaming (understood as "wagering on games
of chance")" per se but is, rather, directed at harm to the community. Section
197(1) defines a "common gaming house" as, among other things, a place "kept
for gain to which persons resort for the purpose of playing games."" In Rockert,
the majority observed that "'resorting' connotes habitual or frequent" use of a
place." Furthermore, section 201(1) states: "Every one who keeps a common
gaming house ... is guilty of an indictable offence." 2 Again, the majority in
Rockert noted that "keeps" "connotes frequent or habitual behaviour."" If sec-
tion 201(1) was supposed to express the wrongfulness of gaming, one would
expect the provision to apply whether or not the wrongful activity was "frequent
or habitual." Moreover, section 197(2) states that a place will not be considered
a "common gaming house" so long as it is "occupied and used by an incorpo-
rated genuine social club," its keeper does not directly or indirectly receive the
proceeds from games played therein, and only authorized fees are charged for
participation in the games." If section 201(1) is supposed to express the wrong-
fulness of gaming per se, this exception is unintelligible. Why would gaming be
less wrong just because those participating in it were members of a social club?
Why would the state license gaming in the first place if it is wrongful?
Read together, these sections strongly suggest that the common gaming
house provisions are aimed at the wrong of causing a particular kind of harm to
the community. The fact that the use must be habitual or frequent indicates that
the targeted wrong does not emerge "instantly" but crystallizes over a period of
87. R. v. Rocker, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 704 at para. 21 [Rockert].
88. R. v. Labaye, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 at para. 30.
89. See R. v. Di Pietro, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 250.
90. Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 197(1) [emphasis added].
91. Rockert, supra note 87 at para. 19, citing R. v. Patterson, [1968] S.C.R. 157 at para. 6.
92. Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 201(1) [emphasis added].
93. Rocker, supra note 87 at para. 19.
94. Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 197(2).
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time. The concern is with the corrosive effect that a common gaming house
will have upon the community if operated on more than a sporadic basis. At
the same time, the provisions apply only where the gaming house is open to the
community at large; i.e., where the community is not insulated from its corro-
sive impact.
Section 198(2) states: "a place that is found to be equipped with a slot ma-
chine shall be conclusively presumed to be a common gaming house."" Section
198(3) defines "slot machine" for the purposes of section 198(2):
In subsection [198](2), "slot machine" means any automatic device or slot ma-
chine
(a) that is used or intended to be used for any purpose other than vending
merchandise or services, or
(b) that is used or.intended to be used for the purpose of vending merchan-
dise or services if
(i) the result of one.or any number of operations of the machine is a
matter of chance or uncertainty to the operator,
(ii) as a result of a given number of successive operations by the opera-
tor the machine produces different results, or
(iii) on any operation of the machine it discharges a slug or token,
but does not include an automatic machine or slot machine that dispenses as prizes
only one or more free games on that machine.9 7
Suppose that, through the operation of section 198(2), a person were con-
victed under section 201(1). We could not explain the offender's conviction
merely by referring to the basic fact (that the offender kept a place equipped
with a slot machine) without referring to the inference drawn (that the offender
kept a common gaming house). We have seen that section 201(1) is directed at
a particular kind of wrong-the wrong of causing or risking harm to the com-
munity by regularly providing a venue, open to the public, for wagering on
games of chance. To say that a person was convicted because she kept a place
equipped with a slot machine, though, does not capture the wrong addressed by
the offence. A place equipped with a slot machine may not be used often, and it
95. See R. v. MacDonald, [1966] S.C.R. 3.
96. Supra note 1, s. 198(2).
97. Ibid, s. 198(3).
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may not be open to the public." If we say that a person was convicted because
she kept a place equipped with a slot machine, we imply that sporadic wagering
or wagering among a few friends on games of chance is wrongful. Whether or
not that is true, that is not the wrong that section 201(1) expresses. We distort
the section by suggesting otherwise.
The conclusive presumption contained in section 198(2), then, fails to ex-
press the wrong of keeping a common gaming house just as surely as the rebut-
table presumptions discussed in Part IV of this commentary fail to capture the
wrongs addressed by their respective offences. This underscores the fact that
conclusive presumptions, like rebuttable presumptions, function as decision
rules and not as conduct rules. This, in turn, shows why and how conclusive
presumptions are distinct from offence definitions.
VIl.CONCLUSION
Evidence scholars have been persistent in their claim that conclusive presump-
tions are nothing more than offence definitions in fancy (shabby?) dress. That
claim, if understood robustly, is straightforwardly false. Understanding why it is
false, however, requires us to take a not-so-straightforward tour of the aims and
assumptions underpinning the criminal law. It requires us to keep in mind that
the criminal law does not merely aim at guiding legal officials as they decide
whether there is evidence sufficient to convict criminal defendants. The sub-
stantive criminal law primarily aims at guiding members of the public as they
attempt to live their lives free of wrongdoing. We are, furthermore, called upon
to remember that the rules contained in the criminal law are not all addressed
to both citizens and legal decision makers. Some are, but some are not. Recog-
nizing these facets of the criminal law allows us to make better sense, not only
of the relationship between offence definitions and legal presumptions, but be-
tween both of these and the presumption of innocence.
98. See Shisler, supra note 18 at 540.

